Jawar Mohammed on the current Ethiopian political affairs

Jawar Mohammed on the current Ethiopian political affairs


  1. Guys,
    I have problem what to make of this discussion.
    Jawar presented his analysis very forcefully and eloquently, but his sureness about everything he says bothers me. He sounded to me like an armchair political journalist or a college civic teacher than an activist I have followed for years on the cyber space. His analysis is “take it or leave it” type without giving a listener the chance to reflect on any of it. He looks at an issue from one point of view without giving thought to possible views and he’s sure about the conclusions he makes after analysis. That is an activist’s approach to a certain issue. But the way he analyses issues, he looks like a journalist or a teacher who has no interest in outcomes of events. That’s where I see a serious role confusion. Is he an activist or a journalist or both? I have problem to tell which one he is. Some of you might think this point is irrelevant, but I will show you how relevant it is in my comments later.
    All the same, I say congratulations to him for the evolution he has made from highly vocal, religious, divisive quasi-extreme right nationalist to calm and moderate, secular, and left nationalist uniting voice. Most of the elites I know from the different ethnic groups in our country have problem evolving; I find them stuck recycling outdated views. Bravo, Jawar.
    Having said this, I will start to write my opinion on each issue he discussed.
    To be continued.

  2. This rotten egg son of a bitch! We need no foreigner to solve our problem but an Ethiopian. Why not you say nothing about your country Yemen.

    • First, who are you??
      Second, who is an ethiopian?? Can you give educated answers to these questions, or do you know only insulting?

  3. This rotten egg son of a bitch! We need no foreigner to solve our problem but an Ethiopian. Why you say nothing about your country Yemen?

  4. የዘመናችን ትልቁ የፖለቲካ ኣክሮባቲክስ ከዋኔ !!!!!
    አነ ጸጋዬ፣ ኢስቂኤልና ሌሎች የ OMN የ ”እሮሞ ህዝብ ሞግዚቶች ” ቆዳቸውን እንደባብ ገፈው ምን ኣዲስ መልክ ይዘው ይቀርቡ ይሆን ??

  5. Jawar for most of us is premature and is not ready for complicated political resolutions.Even I’m afraid let alone the History of if grasped Oromo history.Most of us who get chance to say or write our opinion live out side of Ethiopia where almost people of the World dwell together and governed the rule of Law.I am sure Jawar dwells out side of Ethiopia and has the same experience that all of us do.
    Jawar has been congratulated several times before.I was one of those people who defended him when he was advocating Ethiopian unity before Aljezzira exposed him and he became like a wheel of fortune.Though I recounted my support for Jawar after the Aljezzira incidence,to those of you who welcome him I say not to soon.Talking and resolving needs maturity and this man has long way to go.

  6. I just heard from people who got the wind about a group of individuals from the Oromo groups here in the USA who went on a working visit to Egypt and Europe. Was he part of the group? What was the purpose of their trip to Egypt? I and many concerned Oromos want to know the fact, the purpose and what was achieved during the trip to Egypt.

  7. I am getting a lot of e-mails for my comment published above about a week ago. As usual, I have replied to some of you by e-mail. Again, my intention is not to undermine Jawar’s political stature. I agree with most of you who said he is an emerging political star with a uniting voice, but, I also feel that he still needs constructive suggestions to help him become a seasoned politician from which we all can benefit. Time and again, I see that appeasment leads to a downfall of a politician and we can’t afford to lose Jawar. With this, it is time for me to start my comments on his interview.
    I don’t know about you but I found the first question raised to Jawar very direct soliciting a direct answer. Jawar’s answer appears to be focused elsewhere than where I expected it to be. This is my personal opinion on his answer and many of you might find it offensive and reject it.It is your right if you do so, but look at it.
    The question relates to the document issued by the National Information and Security Council (NISC) in which Jawar’s interviewer (I would rather call him interlocutor) opens the discussion by saying “EPRDF or TPLF government admits its weaknesses (in the document)”. Directly transcribed from the interview, the statement reads as “ብሄራዊ መረጃና ደህንነት ምክር ቤት – ስብሰባ – ዶኩሜንት ሾልኮ ወጥቷል:: ኢህአዼግ ወይም TPLF የሚመራው መንግስት ድክመቱን ያመነበት ሁኔታ ነው ያለው:: . . . ”.
    To start with, I am not sure why EPRDF and TPLF were connected by “or” unless there is doubt as to who is responsible for what is going on in the country. In our political discourse, we have reached a point where we make a little or no distinction between EPRDF as a single organization, TPLF-EPRDF to show the power imbalance in the organization with TPLF dominating and TPLF alone. I think this shows the biggest failure of opposition political circles to clearly identify which organization or organizations should be the target for political activism. The interviewr (viz. interlocutor) put EPRDF and TPLF in an alternative position while Jawar singled out TPLF as the focus of his answer even without a passing reference to EPRDF.
    I think the confusion on whom to target for opposition activism is delaying change in the country. I also think the popular slogan “Down, down TPLF … ” is a result of such confusion since it exposes only a fraction of the political problem in the country. I don’t consider myself an apologist for the wrongs of TPLF, but I feel that TPLF is an organization that governs Tigray. Its existence in the country’s politics life will be dependent on the decision of the people of Tigray; nobody else. Even if a new government comes to power via democratic election, TPLF might continue to have a place in the country if Tigray votes for it. Given the fact that the existing federal system is to endure, the way we see TPLF might be important for peace, reconciliation and democracy in a united country. So, “down, down, TPLF” might not necessarily bring its end. No doubt TPLF controls the national defense and the security; built huge economic dynasty for itself; enabled its members and supporters to unlawful enrichment and violated democratic and human rights. TPLF has the upper hand in all this, but are there other organizations who should also face a challenge? If so, who are they and how can they be challenged? When you see this question, some of you might say “silly”. I am serious; TPLF might not be down.
    OK, let me lose this argument and accept that TPLF should be the target for political condemnation. What does “down, down, TPLF” mean if it does not show us who is to be “UP” if and when TPLF goes “down” as demanded. The slogan down with “X” is supposed to always go with up with “Y”. I have not heard who “Y” is from who chant the “Down, down…” slogan. As to me, the absence of common leading slogan is another serious shortcoming of our political activists. I mean in addition to singling out TPLF as the only target for activism.
    Looking at our own recent political history teaches us the role slogans play to spearhead change. “Land to the Tiller” was the slogan of progressive elements of the 1960s and 70s which eventually galvanized forces to overthrow the monarchy and abolish feudalism. The “right to self-determination of nations” that also transformed our country – even if it made her land locked – has led to the existing federalism. Why the two slogans helped usher fundamental changes was because they were forward looking, concrete and inspiring millions to struggle for them. The progressive elements of the time did not stop by condemning the monarchy and feudalism but charted out what was needed to replace them. I don’t see present day activism has learned lesson from this dynamism.
    Coming up with a slogan is not too late or impossible. Jawar himself gives a hint as to what that the slogan could be in his conclusion to his answer of the first question. It goes like this.
    “ወደ መፍትሄ ሲመጡ ግን “ታጥቦ ጭቃ” እዚያው ናቸው:: ጉዳዩ የፖለቲካና የውስጥ መሆኑን ካመኑ በሗላ የፖለቲካ መፍትሄ ከመሻት ይልቅ ወታደራዊ መፍትሄ በመሻት ሃገሪቷ ተመልሳ በኮማንድ ፖስት እንድትገባ ወደእርቅና ሰላም ዲሞክራሲያዊ ለውጥ የሚያቀርብ ሸንጎ ከማቋቋም ይልቅ የደህንነት ሸንጎ ለማቋቋም እያደረጉ ያሉትን ነው ያየሁት::”
    I don’t know what you think, but I see a slogan right here. “Commission for peace, reconciliation and democracy, now”. If we keep circulating this slogan widely and activists in the country pick it up, it certainly will lead to positive change. I think this can complement the famous “Down, down TPLF …” slogan. On top of that, such a slogan will save us from the unnecessary debate as to whether TPLF is the only or even the right enemy in isolation from partner organisations.
    It is the absence of a clear demand backed by a clear slogan that made TPLF- EPRDF to claim that the uprising is not for change of government; it is rather opposition to one organization. That’s why they are re – positioning themselves to govern forever.
    To be continued.

  8. As you may gather from the interview, Jawar was asked to spell out the main points of the document released by the NISC. The question goes like this: “ብሄራዊ መረጃና ደህንነት ምክር ቤት – ስብሰባ – ዶኩሜንት ሾልኮ ወጥቷል:: ኢህአዼግ ወይም TPLF የሚመራው መንግስት ድክመቱን ያመነበት ሁኔታ ነው ያለው:: የዶኩሜንቶቹ አንኳር ነጥቦች ምንድናቸው? ”.
    Jawar’s answer was precise except the mix-up of terms which appears from his elaboration that it was a slip of tongue than anything else. He said:
    “The document is intended to emphasize the need for security/ military solution to a security problem.” (Literally translated from his answer; later on he replaces “security problem” by “political problem” which makes sense).
    To support his answer, he highlights some issues that were mentioned in the document as problems. Some of these are: “lack of peace and stability threatening unity of the country, declining foreign investment and deteriorating economic situation, etc.” Further, he adds, about a month ago, there was a discussion (implicitly by him and others who share his assessment of the country’s situation) on the government’s move towards “security/military” option to suppress the on-going popular uprising. As a close follower of Jawar, I remember the said discussion to have taken place.
    Personally, I don’t think there had been a moment where any uprising – popular or otherwise – had not been treated as a security problem in the country. In effect, major political problems similar to the ones we have right now had rarely been considered political and received political solutions. They have always necessitated overthrow of gouvernements via revolution (1974) or civil war (1991). I have read those in power during the monarchy and derg portrayed people who wanted change in the country as security risks, treated their cases as treason – the highest crime in all countries – and dealt with them severely.
    Given our history, it is no surprise the National Information ans Security Council (NISC) document presented the uprising as a security issue; probably many governments would reach a similar conclusion like the NISC document. Practice throughout the world shows that governments rarely sit idle when they are challenged politically in a manner that changes the status quo. I think Jawar’s assessment of NISC document as posturing to launch security/military sweep makes him look a complete novice to political history – both ours and others. Many of his followers I personally know fell for this hype and resigned to a military rule in the country, but it has not happened until now. At least, not to my observation.
    I guess Jawar’s use of`the term “security – military” solution to a “political problem” does not mean direct military rule. If you ask me my opinion on the possibility of direct military, I would say almost “zero” possibility except if the country’s configuration is to change drastically due to secession. I say this because the military and security are headed by people who have been and still are members of TPLF and they appear to work together from the start till now. They have, without declaring it, used security/military measures as the situation demanded and they do not appear to disturb an arrangement that has worked effectively for them. What happened following the discussion of the NSC document was simply a ban of “protest rallies across the country”. That might fairly be characterized as “security” solution to a “political problem”, but falls far short to be called “military” solution. For a clear understanding of this, it might be essential to separate “security solution” from “military” solution too.
    Before I close my view for today, I will bring your attention to one point Jawar raised. It goes as follows: Jawar adds: “TPLF is defeat politically particularly by being outsmarted by OPDO and ANDM and exacerbated by its failure to answer peoples’ legitimate demands which left it with no option except to present the situation in the country as a security/military issue than a political one.”
    As I said above, the document resulted in a ban of “protest rallies across the country”. The ban is definitely in the best interest of TPLF, but how come it was not outsmarted by OPDO and ANDM and its interest rejected? They were present and approved the ban. How come they have not questioned a ban that violates a right enshrined in the constitution and approved in violation of power of parliament to debate and legislate on it? TPLF is accused of failure to answer people’s demands, but what are OPDO and ANDM doing when they banned rallies in which people express what they do not want. Soon they will demand what they want, but how can express it when they’re banned from rallies.
    OPDO and ANDM are being praised to a degree of flattery simply because they were overwhelmed by the uprisings and in disarray to stop the rallies. This gave the impression that they are with people protesting which might have not been the case.
    Jawar deserves the benefit of the doubt. To him OPDO and ANDM have outsmarted TPLF. Reality on the ground does not fully support this assessment. I understand the effort to isolate TPLF, but OPDO and ANDM need a serious scrutiny before they are endorsed as agents of reform or change. Non-partisans like me should be careful before we jump on the bandwagon.
    To be continued.

  9. Guys!! Jawar Mohammed has explained very deeply and with understandable meanings about the current condition of Ethiopia.As you immagine, the government of Ethiopia has no problem of adminitrating the country prorperly. Genealy,the country is progressing in development; such as economically, politicaly,and socially. Nowadays, in Africa, Ethiopia is the leading and the fastest among the developings. It is an amazing progress!!! Whenever something happened, the media exaggerating as big as elephant. Its security has confidence and unity is still strong.

  10. I regret typo errors on my previous posting. I sit for ten minutes to write what comes to my mind, but lack the patience to edit it in another five. I promise to use some of my precious school time for editing in the future. I thank those who brought the problem to my attention. I encourage you to keep on sending your feedbacks.
    The second question in Jawar’s interview was a continuation of the first which relates to National Security Council (NSC) document. The question subtly injects a serious doubt on the honesty of TPLF – EPRDF’s admission of failure to address peoples’ demands. It mentions that such previous admissions were seen with suspicion by the public because they had not resulted in anything. In fact, it suggested that it had been a ploy designed to loosen peoples’ vigilance.
    The question in its entirety goes as follows:
    . . . ድክመታቸውን ብዙ እንዳመኑ ነው ዶኩሜንቱ ያስቀመጠው:: ይሄ ማመን ነገር በጥርጣሬ የሚታይ ነገር ነው:: በ2008 ጥልቅ ተሃድሶ ለማድረግ ተዘጋጅተናል: ድክመት ነበረብን ብለው ነበር:: ከዚያም በሗላ ታጥቦ ጭቃ ነው የሆነው:: ይህም ህዝቡን ማዘናጋት ነው የሚል ነገር አለ:: እንዴት ታየዋለህ?
    Jawar said nothing new from what he said in response to the first question which I had discussed briefly in my previous posting. In all fairness, what I heard now was an elaboration to buttress the said answer. The only thing different is the way he reformulated his view and the way he presented it. He said: “When a political organization is unable or unwilling to provide a political solution to a political problem, it resorts to a military solution. Particularly when it believes it has comparative advantage in the military sphere at a time it has no dominance in the political field and realize it cannot win in the political competition; it resorts to seek military solution.” Jawar is of the opinion that the NSC’s admission of failure is a justification for a move in this direction.
    As you can see for yourselves, the question suggest that such admission is not new – even mentions the 2008 admission. If my memory does not fail me, analysts in 2008 speculated that the admission is preparing the country for military takeover, but it did not happen. Personally, I feel that Jawar’s answer did not address what the interesting question impliedly raised: “WHAT IS NEW THIS TIME AROUND?” He did not address what is different now from 2008 where analysts also predicted a military takeover. He appears to be sure that a military takeover is imminent now because TPLF has lost power, but he does not tell us with certainty if there is any move by the military in that direction. He did not reject if this admission should not be seen with suspicion and that it only serve as a ploy to distract people from vigilance; he did not confirm it either. Instead, he went on reciting the factors the NSC document mentions as causes for concerns – most of which he had already raised in his previous answer. Honestly, I am disappointed with this part of his answer to the question.
    Interesting though is Jawar’s suggestion that the NSC document intimidates (scares) EPRDF members and supporters to make them endorse military rule. To support his view on this issue, he related Mugabe’s removal from power. His view is the assessment in the NSC document is similar to the assessment of the military that removed Mugabe from power. Logically, this leads to the conclusion that similar situation might result in similar actions and outcomes.
    However, the truth of the matter is that Zimbabwe and our country are different. I hope I will be spared to list out a myriad of factors that make the countries different. Even in Zimbabwe, it is obvious now the military did not take power. Jawar argues TPLF generals are pushing for a military takeover without giving any proof. He also argues TPLF and the security establishment also support military takeover without showing any evidence to substantiate his claim. The only thing he has is economic interests of the generals which he says will make the generals take power to protect their interests.
    Admittedly, the generals will do everything possible to including taking power to protect their economic interests, but I do not see any serious threat to their interests at this stage to make them in a manner Jawar suggests. As I said in my previous posting, my personal observation and the observation of many is that they appear content with the existing situation until a serious threat emerges. For now, there is none. Over all, a military takeover in our country is a very, very remote possibility except in conditions such as complete breakdown of law and order throughout the country without exception or imminent separation of a region in violation of what is provided in the constitution. And, the country is not in that trajectory.
    Jawar has one ridiculous argument too which goes : “TPLF which has no leadership since Meles’ death whose internal situation is exacerbated by this problem combined with the resistance from OPDO and ANDM to whom TPLF has lost the political completion, makes it to push for a military takeover.” But, the fact that OPDO and ANDM endorsed the assessment of the NSC document and joined TPLF in the ban of “protests” does not show their resistance but their collusion if not continued subordination. If that’s not the case, show me the proof that OPDO and ANDM resist TPLF and defeated it in political completion. The entire analysis looks a wishful thinking for me.
    I know politics is nice for making wild speculations. Making speculations without proof undermines political stature. By the way, if what J. says is true what stopped the military from taking over in 2008 and now?
    To be continued.

  11. Here is my fifteen – minute write up for today. Thanks!
    The interview with Jawar sounded bigly funny when the overthrow of the present prime minister by the military was a point of discussion. To make easy for you to appreciate how bigly funny it sounded, I have transcribed the question raised to him as follows.
    “ሁኔታውን ከደርግ ሁኔታ ጋር የሚያመሳስሉ አሉ:: ሃይለ ስላሴ ስልጣን እንዲለቁ ብዙ ግፊት ነበረባቸው:: በኋላ ወታደሩ ተደራጅቶ መፈንቅለ መንግስት አንዳደረገ ነው:: አሁንም ሃይለ ማርያም አካባቢ ድክመት አለ:: አንዳንድ ወገኖች ስልጣን እንዲለቁ እየጠየቁ ነው:: ይሄ ወታደራዊ ደርግ ስልጣን ይወስዳል የሚል አስተያየት እለ:: በዚህ ዙሪያ ምን ትላለህ?”
    I don’t want to go into the argument whether or not the overthrow of the Emperor was a coup d’état by the military which is the same as “መፈንቅለ መንግስት” (a term actually used by the interviewer viz. interlocutor himself) or a snatching of an outcome of a revolution by the military. That issue had been discussed in the past and due to the lapse of considerable length of time, what remains. I believe, is better left to political historians than to us to get bogged down on it now. Assuming it was a coup d’état as the interlocutor claims, I will reformulate his question raised to Jawar in a simple way. “Is ሃይለ ማርያም to face similar coup d’état by the military like the Emperor? The interlocutor who named the military which he thinks might take power as Derg seemed interested to hear Jawar’s opinion on the similarities of the military which overthrew the emperor and the military that might overthrow ሃይለ ማርያም. What a question!
    Jawar’s begins by saying the situation is similar in certain respects while it is different in others. Without specifying what his perceived similarities and differences are, he went on to mention the senility of the emperor. Jawar was not asked where he got the information about the emperor’s senility. Pesonally, the only claim openly made on the emperor’s senility I know was made by one Michela Wrong whose love for Eritrea and hate for Ethiopia is ostensibly legendary. Ms. Wrong, in a book she wrote under the title “I Didn’t Do It For You: How the World Betrayed a Small African Nation”, she made that big claim without substantiating it with any medical evidence from a qualified physician. I would be happy if Ms. Wrong or somebody else enlightens us on the issue.
    The other point Jawar raised about the emperor was his purportedly inability to prepare an executive to replace him after he passes. The sad thing is Jawar trashed the emperor without telling us if and how the emperor’s situation is relevant to the present. Instead, he jumps into discussing of what he called TWO reasons for the existing political turmoil in the country. The first reason he gives is the death of Meles Z. which he claims resulted in the continuation of dictatorship in the country without a dictator. This gives the impression that Jawar believes the governance under Meles was dictatorship whose death created a dictator’s power vacuum. While elaborating it, he asserts that the guy who replaced Meles Z. lacks the competence to be a dictator and the political base for dictatorship as well. Then he unambiguously claims the dictatorship has no leader. In summing up this point, he drops a bombshell: that TPLF’s failure to replace Meles with a leader of the same stature has weakened the organization. On top of this, he adds that TPLF does not have collective leadership which Jawar seems to imply it used to have under Meles.
    After hearing Jawar’s response to a straightforward question which needs a reply in kind and after reflecting on it, I didn’t know whether to rejoice or mourn. Senile or not, the emperor is gone. However, I can’t think of any executive other than a monarch that really, really worries about his – her replacement. All monarchs, past and present, have widely known line of succession of executives. Take current monarchs ruling around the world to confirm this truth.
    Jawar might not know, but the emperor, like every other emperor had an executive ready for decades to replace him – a crown prince. If preparing executive is about making sure parliament and PM and cabinet existed, the constitution he had put in place was to take care of the matter. So, I don’t see any reason to denigrate him for not making ready an executive to replace him. Be it as it may, I rejoice because not only the emperor has gone forever but the monarchy as well. I was a bad administration that did not deserve to stay longer in power.
    Coming to TPLF, I also rejoice because Meles is gone and TPLF is weakened. The question, however, is is Jawar rejoicing as well as me or mourning? I hear him exalt Meles all the time as the supreme “LEADER” in similar language people in the country who want his “legacy” to continue speak. The irony is Jawar exalts Mele as the supreme “LEADER” at the same time he calls him a notorious dictator. I see a serious contradiction Exalting one as a supreme leader and calling him as notorious dictator appears a serious contradiction to me that requires a serious explanation. Does it mean he is sorry or unhappy TPLF is unable to get a Meles type supreme leader? I don’t know the answer and I want Jawar to explain the point.
    Not only that. I want Jawar to also explain the collective leadership of TPLF which he says had under Meles but lacks now. Is he sorry for that too? If he is talking about division in the organization, it is not their first and appears not to be their last. The reality is that, even if Meles and the collective leadership are gone, they seem tobe still on the helm. I don’t see them suffering from whatever is gone.
    Meles and his collective leadership aside, here are questions that are more of academic in nature with little or no relevance to our present discussion. Is dictatorship possible without a dictator? Assuming that there is no individual dictator like Meles was and TPLF lacks collective leadership which enforces dictatorship, is it possible to visualize the presence of dictatorship in the country? If dictatorship exists and if the present PM lacks the competence and political base to be a dictator, how is dictatorship exercised right now? How does it manifest itself? Overthrow of the monarchy in our country was unachievable without removing the emperor and his successors form power since he and his family were the actual embodiment and expression of the administration. So, there was every reason to remove him from power to end the monarchy.
    Coming to present situation, if, as Jawar claims, the PM lacks the competence and political base to be a dictator, why would the military remove him if dictatorship continues without a dictator? As to me, the Jawar’s view does not make sense. I feel reflecting on these questions might help us to better understand the political situation of our country and reorient our activism to results .
    Jawar next discusses how the Oromo uprising exacerbated the condition of TPLF and further weakened it. No doubt that TPLF is shaken by the Oromo uprising, but how about the other uprisings such as the uprisings of the Amara, KONSO, Afar, Southern region and elsewhere? Did he deliberately omit them or inadvertently failed to mention them? What’s surprising than anything else is what he called the Oromo uprising “strategy” which he claims to have been a big part of weakening TPLF to what it is today. As a strategy, he says the following was the order pursued: first the political uprising and then the economic uprising.
    I seriously doubt if there was such a strategy that delineated the economic and political simply because the first demands that were heard and seen were purely economic demands such as the cessation of land seizure and provision of adequate compensation issues, end to widespread unemployment and high price of basic necessities made worse by inflation. The political issues were there from the start but were less clear until the famous “down, down TPLF” chant. Truth be told, the economic and political demands went together one dominating over the other as situation necessitated. Putting a neat order as Jawar did is very, very simplistic. As to me, closing roads, burning vehicles, destroying property, etc. were only part of both the economic and political uprising.
    The funniest part is Jawar’s subtle claim that he led the uprisings. At the peak of the uprising, I remember the OLF from Asmara had also made similar claim even giving orders to the people back home which apparently went into deaf ears. Since Jawar mixes up the political cum economic nature of the uprisings or was unable to adequately explain their sequence, I doubt if he did not go unheeded in exactly the same manner as the OLF. Not only in the Oromo uprisings; it was the same in the uprisings in the other regions too. People seem to have taken it upon themselves.
    The final point Jawar raised relates to the military under the emperor which he generously characterised as professional and TPLF generals whom he called divided on ethnic lines and hence ineffective compared to those during the emperor’s rule. Surprise, surprise! Jawar found one issue to praise the defunct emperor. I am not sure if Jawar is right in his assessment that the present generals care only for their pockets and not for TPLF; he appears to have forgotten that they were one in the distant past; have been work together since and are still working together.
    I also doubt that the generals will not rule even six months if they take power because they are divided on ethnic lines. For this, I suggest to you to look at my previous postings in which I rule out the possibility of military government in the country except in very, very limited circumstances which do not exist right now. So, why wonder how long they will or will not be in power? The risk of such bravado of military takeover is to make it think seriously about the possibility. We have seen military rule in the past and is not fun.
    Jawar concludes his answer by suggesting that the generals want to push out the current PM out of office, but they have no confidence to do it. He adds that’s why they created the command post. I don’t want to repeat myself and bore readers since I have already discussed this silly view. It simply shows how Jawar is gullible when he faces serious scrutny.
    To be continued.

  12. Thank you JAWAR bro

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published.